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Refocusing the Australian Army 
John Blaxland 
Recent operations have distracted the Army from being best postured for 
regional engagement.
1
  As the Afghanistan commitment winds down, the 
Army will need to overcome this neglect by shifting its primary focus to 
regional priorities, where geographic determinants and great power 
dynamics will feature.  The maturation of defence infrastructure and 
capability projects dating back to the 1980s, coupled with capabilities 
entering service soon, means that the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and 
the Army in particular, has a strong foundation from which to refocus on 
engagement with regional forces, albeit with some exceptions.  For instance, 
recent operations have demonstrated the need for sound intelligence 
support and a pool of language-trained and culturally-aware personnel, but 
regionally-oriented skills in these areas have atrophied.  Beyond maintaining 
broad capabilities for a wide range of contingencies, the key to ensuring the 
Army‟s successful reorientation will be a regionally-focused reinvestment in 
intelligence, language and culture skills.  
Emphasising Regional Operations  
The Australian Army of 2011 has been shaped significantly by its experience 
in recent operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan.  It also has a long 
history of engagement away from Australia‟s shores dating back to the 
expedition to Sudan in the nineteenth century.  But the „arc of instability‟, 
stretching from Aceh to Tonga, and the range of security concerns in the 
Asia-Pacific suggest that the Army must not lose focus on Australia‟s region 
as it determines future force structure, doctrine and capability priorities.  This 
means that beyond the Afghanistan commitment, configuring the Army to 
meet regional security challenges must be a principal priority.  Plans are well 
in play for significant capability enhancements, acquired with regional 
concerns in mind, to become operational in the near future.  These 
enhancements also will enable the Australian Army to muster more 
significant responses to contingencies beyond Australia‟s immediate region 
(in East Asia or the Middle East, for instance) should the need arise.  But 
any such calls will have to be weighed on their merits and drawn from extant 
capabilities designed to meet Australian and regionally-based contingencies.  
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Enduring Determinants: Geography and Great Powers  
In mustering forces for a wide range of contingencies, there is plenty of 
scope to argue over the exact configuration required for the future Army, with 
a range of traditional and non-traditional security concerns expected to 
demand attention.  But, as ever, geography and great power dynamics in the 
Asia-Pacific region will be key determinants for Australian defence planning.  
In terms of great power dynamics, the rise of China as a key player in 
regional security affairs is the most significant recent development.  
Particularly noteworthy is China‟s growing military muscle and more 
assertive posturing over a number of territorial disputes including in the 
South China Sea.  China‟s rise will demand circumspect and nuanced 
engagement in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, utilising the ADF on 
exercises and confidence and capacity building activities to ensure 
Australia‟s national interests in the region are addressed.   
At the same time, the leadership role of the United States in Asia-Pacific 
security remains a key factor. To be sure, massive debt and predictions of its 
eclipse and demise suggest that the United States might waver in its 
commitment to regional security and stability.  But there are enduring geo-
strategic, military and economic factors that indicate that the United States 
will remain a regional great power.  These factors include the United States‟ 
straddling of the Atlantic and Pacific, its secure and dominant position on the 
North American continent and its internal geographic, demographic, 
economic, cultural and technological dynamism.
2
  America‟s strong cultural, 
military and economic ties with Australia also point to an enduring and 
compelling motivation for continued US engagement, and for Australia to 
stick close to its great and powerful friend.  In addition, calls from across the 
region to remain engaged and enduring American interests at stake in the 
region will likely continue to underwrite Washington‟s role as the principal 
security guarantor in the Asia-Pacific region.
3
  
These enduring regional determinants were understood by the authors of the 
2009 Defence White Paper.
4
  Critics of the White Paper have argued over 
the funding modelling and the potentially conflicting regional ambitions of the 
United States and China.
5
  But such perspectives downplay the value in the 
ADF having a solid longer term sense of direction, even if the numbers of 
platforms to be purchased are rubbery.  The framework set by the White 
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Paper builds on Australia‟s Strategic Policy Report of 1997
6
 which provided 
the required certainty for future strategic planning.  That certainty points to 
the Army‟s need for a balanced force
7
, capable of operating in the pursuit of 
Australia‟s national interests, often alongside its principal ally and regional 
partners.  That also means being able to deploy and sustain forces on 
operations in the face of a spectrum of contingencies around Australia‟s 
shores and within the region.   
Broad Capabilities for Security Operations 
The geographic and great power determinants present the Army with a 
challenging array of potential options: it will be required to train and prepare 
for short-notice, non-traditional security contingencies such as humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, as well as more robust force projection and 
sustainment capabilities for in extremis scenarios.  To be sure, the Army is 
well to place emphasis on „traditional‟ conventional warfare skills as its base 
line to prevent the atrophy of otherwise not fully tested capabilities essential 
for conventional war-fighting.  These concerns have driven the Army to 
introduce the adaptive campaigning training cycle, with the major 
conventional military training activity conducted in 2010 (Exercise Hamel) 
being the prime example.
8
  The Army of 2011 sees little to indicate that the 
need for conventional military capabilities will diminish in the foreseeable 
future.  Fortunately, many of these capabilities are directly applicable for 
short-term use in a wide range of domestic and off-shore non-traditional 
security circumstances.  This is a sensible and practical approach to take to 
training. 
Grappling with ‘Amphibiousity’ 
For a country like Australia, which has long been concerned about the sea-
air-land „gap‟
9
 to its north, the importance of the new amphibious Landing 
Helicopter Dock ships (LHDs) is not to be underestimated.  The delivery of 
two LHDs can be expected to enhance significantly the ADF‟s ability to 
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support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief-related missions, let 
alone a range of conventional military operations around Australia‟s shores 
and beyond.  But the Australian Army is not the US Marine Corps and should 
be careful about letting the LHDs drive the Army‟s capability development.
10
  
A rotation of company-groups aboard the LHDs seems a sensible approach 
at least as an interim measure.  But to whole-heartedly commit the Army to 
rotating its infantry battalions and attached supporting elements on-board the 
LHDs likely would be prohibitively costly and would generate significant 
challenges and disruption.  On the other hand, the range of non-traditional 
operational challenges faced in recent years point to significant benefits 
accruing from having a pool of amphibious-capable forces available. 
Capability Enhancements Lead to Increased Options  
While successive strategic documents since the 1970s have placed priority 
for the Army on regional engagement, the maturation of major defence 
projects, espoused in the white papers of the 1980s, have facilitated the 
Army posturing itself for a broad range of contingencies affecting Australia 
and the region.  Some of the notable examples of these projects include the 
completed air bases across Australia‟s north, the move of the Army‟s 1
st
 
Brigade to Darwin, the enhanced naval (and customs) presence in the north 
and west, and the establishment of Border Protection Command, supported 
by the Army‟s regional force surveillance units.   
The Army‟s ability to meet its regional engagement obligations has been 
aided by the cathartic experience on a number of operations, particularly in 
East Timor where, for instance, logistic problems arising from earlier 
cutbacks significantly constrained the intervention force in 1999.
11
  Ironically, 
operational commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan (and, to a lesser extent, in 
East Timor and Solomon Islands), have constrained the Army‟s ability to 
engage constructively and more broadly with a range of Southeast Asian 
and Pacific nations.  In addition, critical niche „soft skills‟ essential for 
effective regional engagement have atrophied.  
Intelligence, Languages and Cultural Awareness  
The Army‟s focus on adapting to the amphibious challenge and training for 
conventional war fighting is appropriate given the geographic and great 
power realities in the region.  But with engagement over regional security 
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challenges expected to feature and amphibious capabilities facilitating such 
engagement, the Army needs to work to ensure its engagement is not seen 
as insensitive and counterproductive.  Key to avoiding such an outcome is to 
ensure that the Army‟s „soft‟ skills, in particular its intelligence, language and 
cultural awareness capabilities, are attuned to regional requirements. 
The Army‟s experience in Afghanistan has illustrated the importance of 
accurate and timely intelligence for effective military operations.  For 
instance, task group commanders have spoken about the pivotal role played 
by “fused” intelligence—that is timely intelligence derived from a wide range 
of electronic, human and other sources that provides them with a high level 
of confidence in being able to plan in detail for and then launch successful 
operations that also minimise the damaging fallout of inadvertent casualties.  
Yet these resources, essentially the Army‟s highly-trained intelligence 
personnel and some specialist equipment, are in critically-short supply.  
They need to be placed centrally in the consciousness of Army force 
structure planners and not left aside as peripheral elements to be cobbled 
together in an emergency.   
In Afghanistan, a critical constraint faced in engaging more effectively with 
and understanding the people has been the shortage of trained and trusted 
linguists.  Undoubtedly, there is advantage in having a large number of 
people trained in languages and culture and available for deployment.  Over 
the last few years, the Army has developed a capable group of linguists and 
quasi-anthropologists for use in Afghanistan.  But few can be trained to a 
sufficiently high standard and those that do take a long time to develop.  
What is more, the skills acquired and capabilities developed are context 
specific.  As the Army refocuses on regional security challenges, a 
significant challenge lies ahead in developing and fostering a pool of 
personnel skilled in regional languages that can be called upon at short 
notice.  
Beyond understanding the spoken words, understanding the culture—the 
taboos and the preferences, the biases and preconceptions—has been 
fundamental to enable commanders and soldiers to discern intentions and 
consequences accurately and to plan meaningful responses.  The range of 
contingencies likely to be faced in the region is best addressed by having 
timely and culturally-attuned intelligence that can be acted upon.  Australia‟s 
response to the „War on Terror‟ over the last decade has demonstrated the 
significance of cultural awareness, sound intelligence and language skills in 
responding to the challenges of violent extremists.  A number of federal and 
state agencies are well placed to address these challenges domestically, but 
abroad Defence (with the Army prominent) is often the lead agency.  The 
Army therefore needs to be better postured for such challenges.  
In the meantime, the Army‟s pool of soldiers skilled in regional languages 
and cultural understanding has atrophied.  To be sure, military exercises and 
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exchange programs have been maintained with regional partners in the 
Pacific and Southeast Asia.  But they have been on a reduced footing and 
the diminished level of engagement and the distraction of pressing 
commitments elsewhere in recent years has been noticed by our regional 
partners.  As Australia‟s mission in Afghanistan approaches completion, 
there is a need to reinvest in skills to enable closer and more effective 
engagement in Australia‟s region.  Indeed, relative to the „big-ticket‟ items, 
the investment required is modest, yet with potentially exponential positive 
consequences. 
The Thai Example  
Some may say that the Army can afford to de-emphasise having a pool of 
culturally-attuned linguists and intelligence specialists until a clear 
requirement emerges.  But there is compelling evidence to the contrary 
suggesting that these specialists are a pivotal component of Defence‟s 
regional engagement and cooperation program and that program, over the 
longer term, can pay significant and unexpected dividends.  For example, in 
early September 1999, when Australia was looking around for a regional 
partner to contribute forces and leadership to the international stabilisation 
force in East Timor, assistance came from an unexpected corner.  Thailand 
was the first country in ASEAN to agree to contribute forces and also 
provided the deputy force commander (and currently Thailand‟s Chief of the 
Defence Forces), General Songkitti Jaggabatara.  The agreement came 
after decades of engagement with the Royal Thai Armed Forces and 
followed shortly after the bilateral Exercise Chapel Gold between elements 
of the 2
nd
 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) and the Royal Thai 
Army‟s Ready Deployment Force.  Alongside the contingent was a team of 
Australian Army linguists who helped the Australian commander better 
understand and appropriately respond to the unique cultural dynamics faced 
there.  As it turned out, both units subsequently deployed to East Timor a 
couple of months later.  In effect, Thailand acted in response to Australia‟s 
request for support in recognition of Australia‟s legitimate and genuine 
commitment to regional security and stability over many years.   
In recent years, however, some Southeast Asian military officials have 
privately questioned the level of the Australian Army‟s interest and 
commitment to the region.  Such lessons, therefore, need to be taken to 
heart as the Army and the wider ADF refocus on Australia‟s immediate 
region.  Increased military engagement with Australia‟s great neighbour, 
Indonesia, should be a priority.  Good relations with countries like Indonesia 
and institutional capacity building should not be left to chance.  For healthy, 
mutually respectful and constructive relations, ongoing investment is 
required. 
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Engage in Non-threatening Multilateral Activities 
As the Army looks to reposition for the future, the dividends of investment in 
regional and culturally-sensitive engagement, should be apparent.  In 
Southeast Asia, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and 
related non-traditional security issues have become a touchstone—providing 
a non-threatening context for otherwise wary neighbours to collaborate 
militarily.  This collaboration has accelerated since the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami.  Working within this non-threatening and non-traditional security 
domain has helped to build confidence and, in turn, enhance regional 
stability and security.  In one instance, the United States and Thailand have 
turned what was, during the Cold War, a conventional bilateral military 
exercise, Cobra Gold, into a multilateral exercise attuned to the regional 
dynamics and concerns over non-traditional security priorities.  Some of 
Australia‟s key security partners in the Asia-Pacific, including countries like 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Indonesia, are now active 
participants.   
As Australia looks to refocus on its region, greater engagement in 
multilateral confidence building activities like Cobra Gold would demonstrate 
Australia‟s re-burnished regional security credentials, notably alongside our 
principal ally, the United States.  Similarly, regional partners, particularly 
countries like Indonesia, should be actively encouraged to participate 
alongside the Army on exercises in Australia.  Australia‟s interests would be 
served by bolstering multi-lateral regional co-operation while supporting the 
nation‟s principal ally‟s engagement efforts in the Southeast Asian region.  
Niche Areas for Investment  
The broad range of capabilities maintained by the Army is essential in the 
face of the spectrum of traditional and non-traditional security threats that 
could emerge in the foreseeable future.  But for the Army to be best postured 
to engage regionally, some adjustments are required.  First, greater 
resources will need to be committed to engaging actively in the region‟s 
multilateral exercises and inviting regional participation in exercises based in 
Australia.  Second, key schools will require better resourcing.  These schools 
include the Defence International Training Centre (where foreign students go 
to learn about working with the ADF), the Defence School of Languages and 
the Defence Intelligence Training Centre.  Third, recognising the challenge in 
fostering these capabilities, the Army Reserve should be shaped to assist in 
fostering a pool of talented linguistically and culturally-savvy advisors for 
plausible regional contingencies—in a similar manner to the Army‟s pool of 
specialist medical staff. 
Conclusion 
The maturation of numerous defence projects leaves the Army better placed 
to engage constructively and actively in the region with a firm base in 
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Australia‟s north and more robust capabilities at its disposal.  Moreover, with 
budgetary pressures likely to impinge on US capability and US will to remain 
engaged in Australia‟s near north (particularly in Southeast Asia), Australia‟s 
participation in multilateral regional activities aimed at enhancing regional 
stability like Cobra Gold has become all the more valuable.  Such regional 
activities, notably including Australia‟s bigger neighbour Indonesia, should 
become a central part of the Army‟s thinking.  Defence and Army planners 
and strategists need to take a proactive stance to ensure that Australia‟s 
Army has an increased leavening effect on regional security and stability.  
Having access to a range of enhanced ADF capabilities, including the 
amphibious platforms, means the Army is now better placed to do so.  A 
proactive stance can help to bolster the related regional stability support 
mechanisms linked with bodies such as ASEAN and the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements as they seek to address both traditional and non-
traditional security concerns.  In this context, culturally-attuned, linguistically-
prepared and well-informed soldiers have the potential to be a force for 
good, bolstering the region‟s security and stability, and in so doing protecting 
Australia‟s national interests. 
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